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Abstract  
There are considerable benefits from cooperating among member states on meeting the 2020 
RES targets. Today countries are supporting investments in renewable energy by many different 
types of support schemes and with different levels of support. The EU has opened for 
cooperation mechanisms such as joint support schemes for promoting renewable energy to meet 
the 2020 targets. The potential coordination benefits, with more efficient localisation and 
composition of renewable investment, can be achieved by creating new areas/sub-segments of 
renewable technologies where support costs are shared and credits are transferred between 
countries. 
Countries that are not coordinating support for renewable energy might induce inefficient 
investment in new capacity that would have been more beneficial elsewhere and still have 
provided the same contribution to meeting the 2020 RES targets. Furthermore, countries might 
find themselves competing for investment in a market with limited capital available. In both 
cases, the cost-efficiency of the renewable support policies is reduced compared to a coordinated 
solution. 
Barriers for joint support such as network regulation regarding connection of new capacity to 
the electricity grid and cost sharing rules for electricity transmission expansion are examined 
and solutions are suggested. The influence of additional renewable capacity on 
domestic/regional power market prices can be a barrier. The market will be influenced by for 
example an expansion of the wind capacity resulting in lower prices, which will affect existing 
conventional producers. This development will be opposed by conventional producers whereas 
consumers will support such a strategy.        
A major barrier is the timing of RES targets and the uncertainty regarding future targets. We 
illustrate the importance of different assumptions on future targets and the implied value of RES 
credits. The effect on the credit price for 2020 is presented in an exemplary case study of 200MW 
wind capacity. 
 
 Keywords: RES target, cooperation mechanisms, policy coordination, renewables, 
European energy policy  
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has defined an overall target for renewable energy of 20% in 2020. 
The required total addition of renewable energy for the EU has been distributed among the 
Member States (MS) and translated into national targets for renewable energy taking into 
account selected parameters. The national targets are mainly based on an equal increase from the 
respective shares in 2005. The income level is one additional parameter: A slightly higher burden 
is put on wealthier countries.  However, no consideration has been made to integrating cost 
efficient implementation into the allocation of national targets. Tolon-Becerra et. al. [1] examine 
alternative distribution weights among EU member state targets and illustrate that the targets 
chosen by the EU could be substantially different for some countries if more or less weight is put 
on initial energy consumption per capita or income levels/GDP. While the different weights in 
the analysis of Tolon-Becerra et. al. [1] do not intend to minimise costs of meeting the aggregate 
20% EU target in 2020, it shows that the resulting target allocation can vary significantly, 
depending on the parameters chosen. The cost differences across Europe of implementing 
renewable investment have not been directly included in setting the targets. Since these cost 
differences can be significant for some technologies and regions, there exist potential benefits if 
some of the investment needed to comply with the overall European target could be re-allocated 
from countries with high cost renewable options to countries with lower cost options. This will 
lead to overall reduced compliance cost in Europe. These potential benefits could be realised if 
countries are allowed to implement their targets jointly. With the Directive 2009/28/EC [2], EU 
legislation has opened for such cooperation mechanisms. They comprise: joint support schemes, 
joint projects and statistical transfers as support for promoting renewable energy to meet the 
2020 targets. The details for these mechanisms have not been laid out yet.  
The purpose of this article is to analyse the barriers for cooperation mechanisms and possible 
policy solutions. Furthermore, the article investigates the importance of future RES targets for 
cooperation mechanisms. It takes thus a more general approach than [3], who illustrate the 
possible combination of support schemes and cooperation mechanisms specifically for offshore 
wind energy. The least complicated mechanism is the statistical transfer, an ex-post transfer of 
virtual RES certificates that can be used for target compliance. This mechanism depends directly 
on governmental involvement and can also be associated with the other mechanisms at the final 
stage of transferring the achieved RES certificates from one country to another. As Klessman et 
al. (2010) [4] argue, statistical transfers are not expected to induce significant amounts of 
additional RES development. They argue further that statistical transfers will most likely be used 
as an ex-post allocation mechanism for excess certificates rather than as a mechanism to 
strategically increase the efficiency in the distribution of RES development. Due to the incentive 
structure behind this mechanism, it is expected that only very limited ‘statistical transfer-
volumes’ will be available to MS for complying with their target in 2020 [4]. The reason is that, 
if this mechanism should be used as strategic instrument rather than as an ad-hoc means of 
‘filling the gaps’, MS would have to guarantee the delivery of RES certificates under a statistical 
transfer several years prior to 2020 so that the receiving MS can avoid the development of own 
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RES production. However, many MS (especially those using Feed-in tariffs or other non 
quantity-driven support systems) will not be able to guarantee delivery long before 2020, as they 
will be uncertain in regards to their own target compliance. Therefore, sharing of compliance risk 
would be a critical issue in agreements on statistical transfers ex ante. 
The mechanism of joint projects gives MS that lack sufficient low-cost RES potential the option 
to develop projects in another MS, where the first MS would support private investors in 
undertaking the project. MS can either cooperate on a project-to-project basis or agree on a 
special support framework for a number of projects. These special support frameworks can be 
defined for a certain technology or a certain area, and will typically be implemented in parallel to 
the still existing national support schemes. In the medium to long-term, the cooperation on 
special support frameworks might lead to a further expansion of the cooperation (i.e. through 
standardisation) and therewith lead to the development of joint support schemes.  
The mechanism of joint support schemes is a broad cooperation of MS on a national level. It has 
the greatest potential to efficiently utilise RES potential in the involved MS, as the establishment 
of equal incentives will ensure the development of RES at the most beneficial sites in the 
cooperation area. It is also possible that the MS partially coordinate their national support 
schemes, so that it applies to certain technologies (such as PV) or it applies to specific areas, 
such as the North Sea.  
For technologies with typically very few large projects in a limited area, such as offshore wind, 
the differentiation between joint support frameworks for projects and joint support schemes 
might practically have a limited significance. 
This paper is structured as follows: We first provide an overview of the possible sources of 
benefits from cooperation on achieving renewable targets in section 2. In section 3 follows an 
investigation of the barriers for cooperation mechanisms. Finally section 4 examines some 
design options for joint support schemes and section 5 presents some preliminary conclusions.  
2. Potential benefits of cooperation 
Countries that are designing their support schemes for renewable energy independently from one 
another, without close coordination, might induce inefficient investment in new capacity that 
would have been more beneficial elsewhere and still provide the same contribution to meeting 
the European 2020 RES targets. Additionally, the countries might also find themselves 
competing for investment in a market with limited capital available. In both cases, the cost-
efficiency of the renewable support policies will be reduced relative to a coordinated solution.  
The fact that a country actually has difficulties meeting their own 2020 RES target, for example 
due to limited resources or adverse market conditions, is not the determining factor for whether a 
country will benefit from cooperation. Assuming that the costs of installing the marginal RES 
unit in one country is less than the costs of installing the marginal RES unit in another country, 
the country with the highest marginal costs of RES will benefit from installing its RES in the 
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first country. Furthermore, as the countries will enter an agreement sharing the total savings, the 
country with the lowest marginal RES costs also benefit from cooperation.  
In this paper, we look mainly on a situation where there are considerable benefits caused by large 
differences in RES costs and differences in other parameters such as power prices that can 
facilitate secondary benefits as well. The benefits of cooperation can be grouped into two 
categories: 
 
1. Primary benefits: reduced target compliance costs 
2. Secondary benefits: e.g. reduced cost in electricity supply and faster RE technological 
progress 
2.1 Primary benefits 
Cooperation and coordination across countries can contribute to a more efficient expansion of 
renewable generation in Europe and can therefore reduce the costs of compliance with the 2020 
renewable targets. Often, the main potential for addition of renewable energy are located in 
border areas between markets with different support schemes and different rules for market 
access, market integration (incl. balancing responsibility) and development of transmission 
capacity. It can be expected that especially in these areas, major benefits can be easily harnessed. 
The main cost reduction can be expected from direct RES costs, but the value of the potential 
generation depends heavily on the power market structure and generating capacity mix in 
general.  
For example, a country with low wind conditions and no biomass resources may achieve their 
RES target considerably cheaper by investing in generation capacity in other countries that 
possess an excess of these relatively cheaper renewable options. 
The larger the difference between marginal costs of RES expansion between two countries, the 
larger the benefits of jointly meeting the targets will be since the country with the very high costs 
of RES expansion will face substantially lower costs exploiting the opportunity to install the RES 
in another country. The cost reduction will not be equally shared between the two countries in 
the first place. This stresses the need for the participating countries to develop a mechanism 
securing proper sharing of the cooperation benefits. 
 
2.2 Secondary benefits 
It is quite important that the primary benefits, given by reduced costs of compliance with 2020 
renewable targets, are not achieved at the expense of some secondary objectives of the national 
RES policies. The secondary group of benefits of cooperation accounts for the less measurable 
benefits as well as other secondary policy objectives. Among these counts:  
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• Technological progress 
• Power generation efficiency 
• Employment effects 
• Security of supply 
• Investor risk 
• Political risk 
Technological progress 
One of the most important secondary benefits expected is technological progress. An increase in 
the installed capacity of renewable energy sources is expected to lead to an increase in the level 
of research and development and learning effects and thus faster RE technological progress [5-
7]. This argument is valid at the global level and there is not necessarily an effect in the country 
where the RES expansion takes place. 
Higher level of research and development and thus faster RE technological progress is expected 
to have positive employment effects in MS. Furthermore, as installing more RES capacity is 
expected to increase the domestic demand for RES technologies, learning effects are expected to 
provide competitive advantages for producers of renewable technology.  
Power generation efficiency 
Increased cooperation could reduce power generation costs by allocating renewable investments 
to capacity where the existing marginal efficiency is relatively low. This is for example the case 
where additional power generation capacity is actually required, as compared to countries where 
additional renewable generation will replace relatively new, efficient conventional generation. 
As the short term marginal costs of electricity production from RES are expected to be less than 
the short term marginal cost of conventional (fossil) technologies, price reductions in electricity 
supply are expected. However, this is not an efficiency increase since it is the long term costs 
that exhibit the economic efficiency. Cooperation projects that involve expanding the 
interconnection capacities, for example to bring off-shore wind power a-shore in a high price 
area would certainly also improve the generation allocation efficiency.  These efficiency benefits 
will not necessarily be evenly distributed and the price effects most likely will be different in 
cooperating countries. Nevertheless, the efficiency improvement could provide an important net 
benefit that could accrue to the country that only has limited direct benefits from the reduction of 
RES target compliance costs.  
Employment effects 
Investment in renewable deployment creates temporary employment in the construction phase, 
and permanent employment in operation and maintenance [7-10]. The short term employment 
benefit is often assumed to affect more remote areas with weak employment opportunities [11] to 
a higher degree than conventional power plant investments. Permanent jobs are also for some 
renewable technologies (biomass) seen as exceeding the number of jobs that they replace in the 
conventional generation [7].  
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Security of supply 
Another benefit from cooperation across countries is increased security of supply. This is 
especially the case if cooperation involves increased interconnection capacity. Interconnection 
will also reduce the reserve capacity requirement and thereby costs of securing supply. 
Additionally, possible positive effects from harmonising connection, planning, and support 
administrative procedures will lead to faster implementation of best practices and thus improved 
security of supply. 
Investor risk 
One of the barriers for investors in terms of investing in renewable energy is the regulatory risk. 
Facing a new technology investors being uncertain of the future support policy will choose to 
invest their money in other markets. However, joint support schemes across countries targeting 
the 2020 RES targets will imply a larger degree of certainty as a change in the support scheme 
would be equal to a breach of international contracts and is therefore not expected.  
Political risk 
Finally, reduced political risk represents a secondary benefit of cooperation. The risk of not 
complying with the 2020 RES targets for the country initially being in lack of renewable 
capacity will be strongly reduced if not eliminated.   
Since the secondary benefits as a point of departure is rather difficult to measure monetarily in 
contrast to the primary benefits (see above), the risk that the primary benefits are achieved at the 
expense of some secondary benefits must be eliminated. 
The potential secondary coordination benefits with more efficient localisation and composition 
of renewable investment can be partly achieved by creating new areas and sub-segments of 
renewable technologies where support costs and credits are shared. Such a solution enables the 
parties to avoid loss of secondary benefits that are linked to their own national support policies 
for all the RES not included in the new cooperation.  
An additional issue relates to the effect on investors’ confidence in the support system. 
Depending on the specific design, an internationally coordinated support mechanism may not 
expose investors to political changes as much as a purely national scheme does. It is difficult for 
countries to change a support scheme if it is a common scheme and guaranteed by more 
countries. 
 
3. Barriers for cooperation 
The overall prerequisite is that MS will only agree on a cooperation mechanism if they both 
benefit from it. A mutually beneficial situation can be achieved if the overall benefits are greater 
than the overall cost and if the costs and benefits are allocated between the MS in an adequate 
way. 
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Klessmann (2009) [12] describes the different elements of costs and benefits for each MS under 
a cooperation mechanism: The primary costs are the support for the produced RES electricity 
(i.e. Feed-in premiums). The primary benefit is the contribution to RES target compliance. As 
described in the previous section, there are a number of secondary cost and benefits that require 
additional adjustments to allocation agreements. Difficulties in quantifying these secondary costs 
and benefits may lead to certain barriers for the implementation of cooperation mechanisms. In 
[13], an overview of all the possible barriers for cooperation is provided and the most severe 
identified. In some situations the secondary benefits will be entirely shifted between MS in 
cooperation and this could be effectively hindering the cooperation.  
Especially local benefits (jobs, security of supply, innovation, export options) are often 
mentioned as a significant element by political decision makers and they therefore constitute a 
barrier if they will be negatively affected in one of the countries engaging in cooperation. 
Additionally the compensation for such losses are very hard to translate into a quantifiable price 
premium on the RES-certificate transfer price. However, the value of these effects is expected to 
be relatively limited compared to the primary effects, and is therefore not included in this paper.  
Another relevant barrier is the one arising as a result of different policy objectives of the support 
schemes. Objectives may be to 1) maintain diversified support in order to achieve political 
accept or to 2) target the support in order to develop specific RES technologies and industries. 
Furthermore, different levels of support as well as the usage of different support mechanisms 
may appear to constitute barriers to cooperation. We therefore suggest that, for example, feed-in 
tariffs for the cooperation can be set at levels that diverge from the rest of the national renewable 
market without distorting the intended investment distribution between locations. 
Barriers also include the influence on domestic/regional power market prices. One market will be 
influenced by for example wind expansion with lower prices that will affect existing 
conventional producers. Supporting that development will be opposed by existing producers 
whereas consumers, who will benefit from it, will support such a strategy. However, the 
investment will be influenced by decisions of producers as well as the possibility of securing 
connection to other markets with higher market prices could reduce the effect of the increased 
RES capacity on the market price. 
Finally, there are a lot of other issues that can constitute possible barriers, such as how to 
structure the agreements legally, how to allocate cost of joint support into the PSO (Public 
Service Obligations) payments for consumers, etc. These issues are not perceived to constitute 
serious barriers and are expected to be fairly easy to overcome [13].  
In the following we address the barriers related to different support schemes and power market 
effects in more detail.  
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3.1 Barriers as a consequence of different RES support systems 
and policy objectives 
There are considerable barriers related to differences in support systems between countries, but 
just as important is the barrier from a difference in the level (cost) of support. Differences in 
support systems cover feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums, green certificates or tendering auctions 
as well as differences in the coverage of technologies with technology banding or technology 
specific support level. 
Cooperation between countries with different support systems can be initiated in two ways of 
which one is moving in the direction of harmonising the two support systems/schemes. The other 
option is to progress with different systems but initiate cooperation based on cooperation projects 
or just using the statistical transfer to exploit imbalances realised ex post in 2020. The first case 
will require very substantial changes to legislation and institutional arrangements where 
adjustments costs and time lags are considerable barriers. In the second case with project based 
cooperation, these costs and time lags are less, but the transaction costs and administrative 
burdens in order to have sufficient volume in projects can be substantial unless standardisation is 
widely possible. Statistical transfers have the lowest barriers, but there is no guaranty that they 
will generate any additional/relocation of actual RES development.    
As countries often apply different support schemes targeting different technologies [14], barriers 
will arise when determining which support scheme to apply in the cooperation, independent on 
whether the two countries agree on going in the direction of harmonising their support systems 
or they agree on cooperation based on cooperation projects. In the following we list the barriers 
that may arise as a consequence of different support systems in the cooperating countries.  
♦ Barriers for combining feed-in and green certificate support schemes 
The two support schemes offer different properties with regard to the volumes realised and the 
support costs. Feed-in does not control the volume and could generate both excess and deficit 
results relative to 2020 RES targets. Green certificate schemes require a broader range of 
conditions fulfilled to work well of which the liquidity and transparency of the market is most 
difficult to satisfy. Combing the two is possible with feed-in for some technologies, where the 
countries prioritise their secondary objectives such as PV industry development and a common 
certificate system for other technologies. The main barrier is that the feed-in easily offer 
technology specific support level and the certificates would work best with competition between 
technologies. One option to combine the two schemes is to introduce technology banding in a 
common certificate scheme and another option is to combine a certificate scheme with feed-in 
tariffs or premiums for a few technologies or installation sizes. In either case, there is a trade-off 
between the efficiency of the scheme to promote the cheapest options and the degree to which 
the combined scheme is supporting diversified technologies. Barriers arise as a feed-in tariff 
support the purpose of developing infant domestic industries, conflicting with the idea of 
implementing RES development where it is cheapest, which certificates would support. If 
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technology banding (technology specific support) motivated by concerns such as security of 
supply, diversification of power technologies etc. is desired, a feed in tariff would be introduced. 
Feed-in tariffs and premiums generally offer less risk in the support revenue to investors, 
whereas the certificate revenue is heavily dependent on if there is a commitment to increase the 
renewable obligations over time. Smaller investors would normally favor the feed-in to the 
certificate scheme if the intended level of support is in the same range.  
♦ Barriers for combining feed-in and tendering schemes 
Feed-in schemes work well with both smaller and larger projects, but are inflexible in providing 
the market incentive to increase or cut back on RES deployment speed. Tendering work well 
with larger projects that require interaction with governmental/TSO planning of infrastructure 
and localisation of investment etc. Feed-in and tendering is often combined with a fixed support 
at the time of settling with the tender winners, but new tenders are not bound with any level of 
feed-in tariff. The actual expansion of renewables can thus be controlled contrary to a feed-in. In 
cases where the tenders are for additional high-cost RES options and can be used for cooperation 
and RES certificate exchange, the combination of tenders and a general feed-in could work.  
3.2 Barriers related to differences in support levels  
Differences in support levels create barriers as they are expressing the willingness of the 
population/government to pay for renewable expansion. Secondarily the different support levels 
can only be harmonised by harming the renewable investment opportunities in the country of 
high support level (see Box 1). Renewable industry, green development supporters and 
renewable investors would all oppose the reduction of support levels even though it is the 
cooperation benefit that reduce costs and therefore enable more ambitious RES targets in the 
future. Likewise the country with low support would have important opposition against the 
increase in support cost for their RES development especially if the burden is directly levied over 
consumers. 
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Box 1 Example: Barriers related to differences in support level.  
 
 
For example, Germany and Spain could decide to cooperate on a joint support scheme for 
new photovoltaic (PV) installations. The two support schemes are currently rather similar, 
featuring a differentiated feed-in tariff. Spain recently introduced a capacity cap, limiting the 
support of new PV installations, because they feared a too high increase of their overall RES 
support cost. At the same time, there is a significant build-out of PV in Germany to a much 
higher RES support cost. Assuming a joint support system, where Germany and Spain would 
have one common market for PV at an adequate common support level, the build-out of PV 
would move from Germany to Spain (due to the much better solar radiation levels). The 
overall support cost would be reduced by the difference of the required support cost in 
Germany to the required support cost in Spain. Germany and Spain would then share the RES 
certificates and the support cost. However, finding the right cost allocation would be a 
difficult negotiation. Germany would have a significant reduction in support cost (per 
generated unit of renewable energy), but would also lose local benefits. Spain would need to 
be compensated for bearing all physical and market integration issues, but would have all 
local benefits including the innovation and industry benefits, which currently seems to be a 
significant factor in Germany’s PV support considerations. 
3.3 Barriers associated with power market regulation, composition 
and price levels 
This subsection addresses the following topics: 
• Difference in network regulation (incentive regulation) approach 
• Difference in power market design/functioning 
• Difference in power market price and price volatility 
• Difference in generation mix and mix of RES technologies 
♦ Barriers related to network regulation 
Network regulation varies a great deal between member states from rate of return to incentive 
based price and revenue caps. The details in incentive regulation include numerous differences 
and the enforcement of regulation is not always effective. Network regulation has impacts on the 
incentives to facilitate efficient connection of new technologies and network reinforcements 
[15]). If national regulation allow networks to include reinforcement investments caused by 
renewable generation in their capital base and thereby their revenue cap this cost will be borne 
by the network customers. In the case of cooperation the country providing the RES credits will 
require the receiving country to compensate also this cost, but the transfer to network customers 
in the receiving country seem very difficult to realise. 
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♦ Barriers related to effects on the power market 
Power markets differ even though they are in many cases coupled and therefore prices to some 
extent are correlated.  Differences in market concentration and technology composition create 
some barriers. The mix of technologies in power generation can be more or less flexible to adjust 
to short term changes in renewable generation. It can be an important barrier for increasing the 
renewable capacity in a country if the inflexibility of the existing generation capacity is 
combined with adding fluctuating renewable generation.   
♦ Barriers related to effects on the power price 
Power price level and volatility differs and creates additional barriers. Price levels in some 
countries will not be affected very much from increasing or decreasing the renewable expansion. 
However, countries where renewable expansion potentials are abundant and cheap could 
experience considerable changes in power prices and corresponding deterioration in profitability 
of existing conventional and renewable capacity. It is not necessarily ease to compensate the 
firms/producers that lose with the gains that consumers experience in terms of lower prices. At 
the same time the country facing the reduced prices will probably have to look for alternative 
ways to provide incentives for future investment in conventional capacity. Furthermore there is a 
risk of increasing curtailment of renewable generators both in the short run and permanently by 
expanding fluctuating renewable at a fast pace. If curtailment is necessary, the issue of 
compensation to generators has to be agreed upon. [16] suggest that this should be with respect 
to primary dispatch: if this has been granted historically, compensation needs to follow, whereas 
the curtailment risk may stay with generators in a more liberalised market environment. 
♦ Barriers related to generation mix 
Generation mix might be quite substantially influenced by intensively exploiting one cheap 
renewable resource. This is a result of expanding the technology itself but also the general power 
price effect (reduced for low marginal costs RES as referred above) which makes the least 
efficient base load plants less profitable or even loss making. The generation mix might then be 
affected in a direction that is providing less security of supply for power and makes the sector 
more vulnerable to changes in a few or just one single fuel price as natural gas. 
3.4 Solutions to barriers 
Above we presented the most important potential barriers to cooperation. In order to ensure 
cooperation the barriers have to be removed. The first step in this direction is to identify potential 
solutions. Solutions to the barriers fall in three categories: 
1. Solutions that facilitate realisation of primary and secondary benefits 
a. Design of harmonised support instruments that reduce the transaction costs by 
increasing liquidity in certificate markets or increase competition among 
renewable investors.  
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b. Coordinate investment timing in larger areas among more countries to utilise 
limited resources of manpower, technical facilities and equipment among 
potential investors (utilities) and in general increase transparency  
c. Ownership structure reorganisation 
 
2. Solutions that improve and guarantee a fair allocation of costs and benefits 
a. Establish a fair and legally backed distribution of benefits and costs 
b. Sharing grid reinforcement costs 
c. How to overcome risk asymmetries 
d. Sharing connection costs 
 
3. Solutions that solve regulatory or technical barriers  
a. Focus on regulatory changes that can be implemented easily 
b. Identify regulatory changes that are unnecessary = two regulatory sets of rules can 
coexist or does not provide unattractive incentives 
c. Reducing financing constraints caused by the non standard support case (simplify 
legal conditions regarding debt obligations in cross border investments etc) 
4. Solutions that exploit resources that could not be accessed otherwise 
a. Focus on areas and resources that have not been included in the original RES 
deployment plans 
b. Sharing of technology and knowledge to exploit additional resources 
c. Infrastructure development that would otherwise not have taken place 
 
Box 2 Example: Connection costs as a barrier and possible solutions 
 
The sharing of connection costs seems to offer benefits from a practical point of view: if a 
joint support scheme refers to an offshore area and is connected to several countries, the 
involved TSOs need to agree on a division of investment costs. This may be done 
proportionally to expected national benefits and could also comprise further effects arising 
from a joint support scheme 
 
Table 1 summarises the main characteristics of the three cooperation mechanisms, the barriers 
and possible solutions.  
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Table 1 Cooperation mechanism characteristics, barriers and solutions 
Cooperation 
mechanism 
Primary cost 
saving 
potential 
Secondary 
benefits involved 
Barriers for 
implementation 
Solution for 
barriers 
Possible time 
horizon for 
implementation 
Harmonised 
joint support 
scheme 
 
Large  
A full 
harmonised 
system without 
technology 
differentiation of 
support yields the 
highest efficiency 
gain 
Larger markets,  
More competition, 
National secondary 
support objectives 
difficult to maintain  
Harmonisation in 
other market 
conditions and 
increased power 
market integration 
Considerable 
time delays in 
legislation,  
Difficult to 
compensate directly 
the losers, 
National control of 
support policy 
reduced 
Compensation 
mechanisms and 
cooperation on 
reaching secondary 
objectives (infant 
industries, employment 
and diversification of 
technologies), 
Allocation of net 
benefits to losers 
Complicated and 
requires national 
legislation delays 
Long term option 
Local/regional  
joint support 
scheme  
Medium level 
Advantage for 
countries with 
shared/bordering 
resources 
Maintained national 
support for not 
covered areas and 
technologies expand 
excess resources 
Opposition to 
favoring investment 
in one area opposed 
to those areas 
covered by national 
scheme 
 
Replicate one system 
from one of the 
cooperating countries – 
limited legislative 
delay 
Medium term time 
scale 
Joint projects 
cooperation 
Small to medium  
advantage for few 
large projects 
Maintain own 
support systems and 
secondary objectives 
Transaction costs, 
Lack of 
transparency, 
Legal requirements 
because of lack of 
legislation 
Target technologies 
with large project size 
Short term time 
scale 
Joint projects 
support 
framework 
Medium Maintain own 
support systems and 
secondary objectives 
Transaction costs 
lower than for 
single project  
Identify 
technologies/areas 
where standardisation 
easy and many small 
projects works better 
than a few large 
Medium term time 
scale 
 
Joint projects are the simplest in terms of need to change regulation and legislation and therefore 
can be implemented in a shorter time frame. 
4.  Cooperation design and future RES targets 
After having elaborated on the qualitative details of the different barriers, we now turn the aspect 
of timing related to joint support schemes. First, we consider cooperation through establishing a 
joint support scheme and sharing support costs according to credits received. Next, we regard 
cooperation through cross border local or technology specific joint support schemes as an 
addition to existing national support instruments 
In the following we present the general solution with just one support scheme for the 
participating countries. It will yield the largest potential benefits, but also faces barriers mainly 
as a result of removing/changing national support schemes and other regulation. Among other 
related considerations, [4] address this topic and refer to the Norwegian-Swedish plans for a 
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common support scheme. Despite a large number of common characteristics, such as a common 
wholesale power market and a comparable geology for hydro reservoirs, it failed in 2006. Only 
after lengthy renegotiations an agreement was reached. The main reason for this first failure was 
that cost attribution could not be agreed upon between the two involved countries. Norway’s 
hydropower share of total electricity generation is at almost 100% and thus, the political target 
was not the achievement of a certain RES share, as it is mandatory for EU countries in 2020. The 
setup for joint support schemes is therefore different between EU countries that all need to 
prioritise their investment. Standard benefits from trade can be incurred from the integration of 
support schemes, but if cheap resources are predominantly in one country (A), a common 
support scheme may ‘sell’ these resources to the neighbour B at a low price. At a later point in 
time, higher RES targets cannot be obtained by A alone because low-price locations are blocked. 
Thus, choosing an international support solution may impact the possible future choices 
negatively from a unilateral point of view.  
 
Figure 1: Marginal costs of RES extension in countries A and B over time 
 
The picture could be different if the marginal costs of RES extension in the two countries 
intersect, as illustrated in Figure 1. The figure displays the marginal costs of RES extension of 
two countries A and B over time t and the RES amount Q. Until the intersection at Q0/t0, RES 
extension can be achieved at lower cost in B, and vice versa. In such a constellation, a 
cooperation could be politically more acceptable for both parties because A receives access to 
low-cost resources in the short run while B secures access to lower-cost resources in the long run 
(beyond Q0). The joint support scheme could be a quota mechanism, a feed-in tariff scheme or a 
price premium scheme. As for all support schemes, basic features such as geographical and 
technological scope and a time horizon for its applicability need to be defined. A tendering 
scheme could also be suitable for a number of large-scale technologies such as offshore wind 
power. If support is granted over a certain time horizon, e.g. 15 years, this extends beyond the 
2020 targets. Support to units in a neighbouring country may then have to be provided on an 
annual basis, although the support does only contribute to fulfilling RES for 2020. 
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We now consider local however cross border or technology specific cooperation where the 
cooperating countries maintain their existing support instruments. Implementing a special cross-
border offshore zone where a joint support scheme could be implemented is a promising option 
that bypasses the barriers concerning harmonisation of the entire support schemes in the 
cooperating countries. 
The combinations of electricity generation sold at one market (country) and the support provided 
partly by another country can be compensated by renewable credits. Such a scheme also has to 
cover the cost and benefits for the national power markets and include this in the compensation 
mechanism or the RES credits transfer price. Sharing the costs and benefits may involve 
swapping the receiver and provider of credits and support in time. One country may face a RES 
target deficit in 2020 but expect additional domestic RES development after 2020. Similarly a 
country already exceeding the 2020 targets might want to secure credits for a future period, still 
allowing another country to earn the credits up to 2020. This could for example be included in a 
joint tendering procedure. 
We now turn to a situation with two countries that are characterised by differences in power prices, 
support schemes (feed-in tariffs vs. tendering) and connection costs attribution.  
Figure 2 illustrates a possible design for a common technology-specific cross-border scheme: a 
neutral price zone has been established, tendering is the chosen support scheme and 
transmission/interconnection costs are borne by the TSO in the high price area. This allocation of 
costs illustrates that the high price area receives the major power price reducing impact. RES 
credits and subsidy costs are shared equally. The alternating price area could gain some practical 
relevance in offshore grids [17] and if interconnector capacity is identical to both countries, this 
implies that always the lower of the neighbouring prices applies [18].  
Another aspect is that in case of an interconnector failure, power would still be provided to a 
country that is involved in the support of the generation units. Contrarily, locations that are 
remote from one country, but close to another shore could be accessed from this other shore. 
Connection costs could be reduced this way by sharing capacity among ‘foreign’ wind farms and 
adjacent national farms under a joint support scheme. 
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Figure 2 Joint support schemes as a subset of support instruments in two or more countries 
 
Tendering is practical for large-scale projects (or bundles of projects) and also mainly applied for 
offshore wind energy, e.g. in Denmark. The tendering design can be such that the investor asking 
for the lowest feed-in tariff over a predefined time period wins, and it can either  be site-specific 
or general but still within the central cooperation area (“x MW have to be built within the 
region”). This cooperation allows national support mechanisms of both countries outside the 
cooperation area to be maintained and could therefore be acceptable for all involved parties. 
Connection costs borne by investors induce that these require a higher feed-in tariff, which 
implies that costs are shared equally between consumers in both countries. For investors, it is a 
crucial question whether both countries reserve the right for changes during a predefined time 
span or whether the support scheme is frozen during this period. In the first case, risk premium 
increases because another government can interfere. In the latter case, the international contract 
between governments ensures that stable environment that investors perceive as superior to being 
exposed to one country’s support scheme. A necessary prerequisite for a cross-border joint 
support scheme is the harmonisation of permission procedures. If administrative requirements 
deviate between countries, a level playing field between all possible locations cannot be 
achieved. Hence, the goal of a least-cost RES extension is out of reach unless interstate 
agreements or a superior coordination body, as discussed in [19], remedy this issue. 
4.1 Future RES targets and the use of cooperation instruments 
One of the important barriers for cooperation lies in the uncertainty regarding the post 2020 
targets for RES shares. The uncertainty influences the value of the possible RES credits from 
generation after 2020. Expecting tighter (higher) targets after 2020 will make excess countries 
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reluctant to sell their relatively cheap RES options off. Countries in deficit considering buying 
credits will be reluctant to support foreign long term investments in RES without certainty that 
the generation credits after 2020 have any value. Table 2 illustrates exemplary calculations of the 
necessary support costs on top of the expected power prices in each country. The example 
demonstrate that the issue of uncertain future RES targets has important implications for the 
cooperation attractiveness where one country is partly or fully financing the necessary support 
for renewable projects in another country. 
The examples shows the effect on the transfer price for credits based on the value per generated 
unit in 2020, of different values of RES technology costs, power price, and the value of the 
credits to the country in which the development takes place (country A). The assumptions 
underlying the calculations in Table 2 are: a technology lifetime of 15 years, annual generation 
4100 full load hours, no discounting, constant real prices and support levels. The most crucial 
assumptions are the RES technology costs in columns 2 and the expected value of future credits 
in column 7. For all levels of expected credit value the calculations are carried out with and 
without a physical transfer of the generated electricity to the other market. The cost of 
interconnection capacity is not included in calculations. 
Table 2 Examples of RES credits prices with permanent or single year transfer, 200 MW offshore wind  
A
ssum
ptions\ 
C
ountry  
R
ES 
Technology 
costs   
W
holesale 
pow
er price 
(generation 
lifetim
e)  
N
ecessary 
support to 
investm
ent in 
country A
a 
Total support 
cost  for 15 
years in 
country A
    
Value to A
 of 
credits post 
2020  
Support costs 
covered by 
country B
 
Transfer price 
credits per 
generated unit 
in 2020
b 
 c€/kWh €/MWh c€/kWh Mill. € c€/kWh Mill. € c€/kWh 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 0 984 120 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 0 701 85 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 2 754 92 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 2 472 58 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 4 525 64 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 4 242 30 
Country A  12 40 8.0 984 6 295 36 
Country B 15 63 5.7 701 6 12 2 
Country A  14 40 10.0 1230 4 771 94 
Country B 15 63 7.7 947 4 488 60 
a: for the entire lifetime of the technology. With and without physical transfer (in italic) 
b: assuming the support for the entire lifetime of the technology is paid in one single year, 2020 
 
The last column is expressing the total lifetime support payments financed by country B per 
generated unit in one single year, namely 2020. These are in most cases much higher than the 
necessary support costs per generation unit for the entire lifetime as illustrated in column 4. If the 
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support financed by country B is covering the entire necessary support because country A assign 
no value to future credits this corresponds to country B buying all the credits at the price of 
5.7c€/kWh as in row 3. Such a situation can be expected for many bilateral cooperation 
possibilities in the EU. For most countries, the value of future RES credits will be rather low, but 
some countries might expect much higher RES targets for the future or they might have national 
targets that exceed the 2020 target set by the EU directive. This is for example the case for 
Denmark that has set higher targets for renewable shares post 2020. 
As such the basic cost savings from cooperation is found as the difference between RES 
generation costs in country A and country B. This is the cost differential in column 2 which is 
3c€/kWh except the alternative in the last two rows with only a 1c€/kWh cost difference. Adding 
the benefits of physical transfer between the two markets is not a result of the cooperation 
project, but might be achieved with just adding interconnection capacity assuming that the 
market price differential is not dependent on the RES project. If there is much larger RES 
expansion than in the present 200MW example, there might be a downward effect on market 
prices in country A if there is no available interconnection capacity. This would increase the 
price differential and make the addition of interconnection capacity more economically 
attractive.  
In reality the transfer price will be a result of a negotiation process and the example of 29.5 
c€/kWh (see Box 3) is a minimum price as the price have to be higher if country A should have a 
net benefit from the cooperation. 
Box 3 Transfer price for 2020 credits with physical transfer, row 7 
 
 Calculation of the transfer price for 2020 credits with physical transfer as in row 7 can be 
exemplified by first calculating the necessary support (column 4): 
(Technology cost in A (12c€/kWh) – market price in B (6.3c€/kWh)) * 4100 hour annually * 
200MW *1000 * 15 years = 701.1 mill €.  
Of this support A will be willing to contribute up to the expected value of 4c€/kWh for the 
remaining 14 years of generation: 200MW * 1000 * 14 years * 4c€/kWh = 459.2 mill €. 
Then B will have to pay 701.1 mill € - 459.2 mill € = 242 mill € for the RES generation 
credits in 2020. This corresponds to 242 mill €/(200MW * 1000 * 4100h) = 29.5 c€/kWh.  
    
The last two rows illustrate a situation where there is only a minor difference between the 
technology costs in countries A and B. The result is that transfer price for 2020 will be high and 
if there is no physical transfer option the domestic expansion of RES in country B will be more 
efficient than expanding RES in country A even though the technology costs are lower here. The 
value of the generated electricity is simply higher in country B than in country A. This could 
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reflect that there is excess generation capacity in A and a need for more electricity capacity in 
country B.   
One consequence of the uncertainty regarding the future target is that renewable technologies 
with the shortest lifetime will be favoured as the total costs per generated unit in 2020 will be the 
least. 
An EU policy for the future RES targets, which not necessarily have to be a specific target, just 
an indication that the future target will be at least at the level agreed for 2020, would reduce the 
uncertainty regarding the value of post 2020 RES credits considerably. Such an announcement 
may facilitate cooperation just by reducing the uncertainty and contribute to reaching the 2020 
RES targets at a lower aggregate cost. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Renewable electricity potentials and costs vary considerably among EU countries. These 
variations in combination with differences in power market structure and price levels must be 
included when examining the benefit of cooperating on meeting the 2020 EU RES targets.  
The potential benefits of cooperation on reaching the 2020 RES targets are of considerable size, 
but the barriers for realising these potential savings are of similar size. Table 1 summed up the 
characteristics and issues specifically involved for each type of cooperation mechanism. The 
conclusion is that the joint projects are the simplest in terms of need to change regulation and 
legislation and therefore can be implemented in a shorter time frame. This type of cooperation 
has its advantage for larger projects such as tendered off-shore wind farms, whereas the smaller 
projects would involve relatively more administrative costs in negotiating and designing 
individual contracts. In case of smaller projects this could be possible if standardisation of 
contracts and conditions is possible.  
The most important barriers are associated with the different objectives of renewable policy 
priorities of the countries. The large differences in existing support schemes, power markets and 
power sector regulation also form considerable barriers. One specific important barrier is the 
large uncertainty regarding the future RES targets. Financing RES expansion in another country 
just to meet the RES targets for one single year in 2020 can be very costly as demonstrated in 
Table 2. 
The simplest solutions in terms of maintaining existing legislation and domestic support 
schemes, but adding new dimensions for support will be the easiest and fastest to implement. 
Here we suggest to look into larger projects for project based cooperation and the joint support 
schemes added on top of national support schemes for specific technologies or areas/regions.  
Cooperation mechanisms involving countries which have similar priorities and at the same time 
exhibit large differences in compliance costs seems the easiest to implement. In this case even 
the harmonised single joint support scheme could be a solution to start moving towards, by 
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defining compensation principles and methods and preparing the national markets for the 
change. 
Joint project cooperation where there are both benefits from difference in RES technology costs 
and benefits from expected difference in power market prices and physical market transfer will 
have the best chances for being implemented. However negotiating the transfer price for credits 
in 2020 is difficult especially since the country binding targets post 2020 are unknown and the 
value of future generated RES credits therefore very uncertain. This may lead to a sub-optimal 
preference for projects with a short lifetime. Announcing some direction for the future binding 
targets of EU would improve on this situation and reduce this barrier for cooperation. 
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